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Erich Hatala Matthes 
Abstract: Philosophers have used the terms ‘impersonal’ and ‘personal value’ to refer to, among 
other things, whether something’s value is universal or particular to an individual. In this paper, I 
propose an account of impersonal value that, I argue, better captures the intuitive distinction than 
potential alternatives, while providing conceptual resources for moving beyond the traditional 
stark dichotomy. I illustrate the practical importance of my theoretical account with reference to 
debate over the evaluative scope of cultural heritage. 
1. Impersonal and Personal Value 
Not everything that is valuable can be valuable for everyone. Indeed, we typically think 
that the value of some things is universal, while the value of others is quite local and particular. 
There is an intuitive difference between, on the one hand, the value of Niagara Falls, or the 
pyramids at Giza, or the reduction of suffering in the world, and on the other, the value of my 
grandfather’s ring, or your childhood birthplace. It is common for philosophers to make this 
distinction in terms of impersonal and personal value. Whereas objects of natural splendor, 
exemplars of human ingenuity, and acts of moral significance are often thought of as having 
impersonal value, the value of objects that are highly specific to one’s own circumstances and 
interests is thought of as personal in nature.1 The intuition in its most general form is that things 
                                                
* Thanks to Kinch Hoekstra, Niko Kolodny, Jay Wallace, and various reviewers and editors at Ethics, especially 
William FitzPatrick, for helpful discussion and comments on drafts of this paper. Thanks, as well, to my wonderful 
colleagues at Wellesley for advice and support throughout the revision process. Finally, thanks to Jackie Hatala 
Matthes, the sympathetic ear for all my ideas. 
1 G. A. Cohen provides a paradigm example of an eraser that he has had for his whole academic career, which 




with impersonal value are in some sense valuable for everyone, no matter their particular 
interests and circumstances, whereas things with personal value are in some sense peculiar to 
specific individuals. It would be unremarkable for anyone to value Niagara Falls precisely 
because of its awe-inspiring impact, whereas if just anyone valued my grandfather’s ring 
precisely because it was my grandfather’s, that might be cause for concern. 
 As intuitive as the distinction may initially seem, if it is to be more than just a gut 
assumption about the evaluative scope of different things, we need a more precise account of 
what makes impersonally valuable things relevant to everyone. People often disagree about what 
things are, or could be, impersonally valuable, and these theoretical disagreements are the source 
of conflicts with broad practical implications. After all, to claim that a given thing is, in some 
sense, valuable for everyone is to make a universal claim about the role that it should play in 
everyone’s lives.2 So, for instance, how and whether we ought to factor the natural environment 
into our practical decision making may be affected by whether the natural environment is 
impersonally valuable. If everyone has reason to value things that have impersonal value, then 
such things will make claims on our attention that those with merely personal value lack. Or 
consider evaluative claims about history and heritage. Some argue that the past should be valued 
as the common heritage of all humanity. Others argue that the value of cultural heritage is 
specific to the geographical, national, or ethnic groups with which it is most intimately 
connected.3 Is the value of cultural heritage personal or impersonal? The answer will have 
substantial practical and moral consequences based on the role that such arguments play in 
                                                                                                                                                       
Existing Value,” in Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon, ed. R. Jay Wallace, Rahul 
Kumar, and Samuel Freeman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). I use ‘objects’ and ‘things’ here in the 
broad sense of any direct objects of our evaluative attitudes, not merely physical objects. 
2 Compare Tom Hurka: “If something is good period it makes a claim on all moral agents, and should figure in all 
their deliberations.” Thomas Hurka, “'Good' and 'Good For',” Mind 96, no. 381 (1987): 71. 
3 These two approaches are described in the influential paper by John Henry Merryman, “Two Ways of Thinking 




conflicts over who has the right to possess, control, and profit from historically significant 
things.4 To invoke a recent example, consider the battle over repatriation of artifacts from Machu 
Picchu that were discovered, excavated, and brought to Yale University’s Peabody Museum of 
Natural History over 100 years ago. Are Incan pottery shards objects of impersonal value that 
warrant the care and concern of all persons, and thus legitimize stewardship and study by 
preeminent archeologists and anthropologists, or even ownership by foreign entities? Or is this 
fetishistic robbery, more on a par with a stranger coveting my grandfather’s ring? 
The uncertainty stems from the fact that “valuable for everyone” is ambiguous among 
multiple interpretations. Are things with impersonal value valuable for everyone in the sense that 
everyone ought to value them? In the sense that everyone ought to at least respect such things, 
even if one does not value them oneself?5 What kind of universality is at play here, and in what 
ways can valuable things secure it? My aim in this essay is to offer answers to these questions 
that will expand our theoretical resources for thinking about the scope of value and provide a 
better understanding of its importance to practical philosophy.  
Part of my enterprise will be negative: I aim to raise doubts about the adequacy of certain 
analyses of impersonal value that might be thought to capture the intuitive universality canvassed 
at the outset. However, much of this essay will be devoted to painting a picture of what a more 
                                                
4 These concerns are often captured with the provocative question “Who owns the past?” See, for instance, Kate Fitz 
Gibbon, ed. Who Owns the Past?, Rutgers Series on the Public Life of the Arts (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 2005). As the language of the question suggests, some approaches to answering it will be primarily 
legal or political in nature, focusing on issues of international law and sovereignty. I put those approaches aside here 
in order to focus on the relationship between persons and value of the objects in question, though I do briefly 
address issues of property and stewardship as they relate to value in the fourth section of the paper. 
5 Moreover, who is “everyone?” Like many others writing on the topic of value, I assume that the scope of values 
ranges over the domain of valuers. So, something that is valuable “for everyone” is valuable for all valuers. 
However, as a reviewer helpfully noted, one might define the domain of valuers in different ways. Does it include 
all valuers that ever exist, or only those existing now? Does it include “marginal cases,” or only full-blown rational 
agents? My sense of the literature is that valuers are often assumed to be rational agents who are sufficiently like 
“us,” but this need not be the case. In fact, by stipulating different domains, one can investigate the different 
domain-specific scopes a valuable thing might have, and the approach that I argue for here can accommodate such 




comprehensive account of impersonal value might look like. That positive account will, 
however, have one further negative consequence: I aim to question the practical and theoretical 
importance of the traditional distinction between impersonal and personal value. Between my 
negative and positive accounts, I hope to show that the traditional distinction is at best 
inadequate, and at worst misleading, when it comes to our thinking about the scope of value.  
I will first consider the view, which emerges from the work of Thomas Nagel, that the 
universality of impersonal value is secured by the fact that such value can be recognized from an 
impersonal perspective.6 I suggest that the independence from particular perspectives is what 
makes impersonal value especially compelling on this account, calling for everyone to actively 
value things that possess it, which in turn makes this a plausible account of impersonal moral 
value (such as the importance of reducing suffering). However, both the independence from 
particular perspectives and the compelling force of impersonal value render this account inapt to 
capture the intuitive category of non-moral impersonal value (which is ostensibly possessed by 
such things as Niagara Falls, great works of art, and perhaps historical artifacts), which does not 
have the compelling force of moral value and whose importance is often best characterized from 
within particular perspectives.  
I will next consider the prospects for thinking about impersonally valuable things as those 
that everyone ought to respect, though everyone need not value. This second account, inspired by 
the work of Joseph Raz, thus understands impersonal value in terms of required respect.7 I am 
sympathetic to the idea that all impersonally valuable things deserve respect. The shortcoming of 
this analysis is that it fails to capture anything distinctive about impersonal value. As I will 
argue, it is plausible to believe that all valuable things require this kind of respect, even where 
                                                
6 Specifically with Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (USA: Oxford University Press, 1986).  




their value is a paradigm of personal value. Hence it is not that this account is mistaken as a 
general claim about our relationship to valuable things, but rather, that it fails to capture the 
desired category of impersonally valuable things that are valuable for everyone in the distinctive 
sense evoked by the examples with which we began. 
Given the inadequacy of these two approaches for understanding the range of ways in 
which values can achieve universality, we have good reason to seek a more comprehensive 
account. I argue that impersonal value is best understood in terms of everyone’s having good 
(though not necessarily compelling) reason to value objects that possess it. For the purposes of 
this argument, I will assume that the objects under consideration are in fact valuable, and that the 
reasons to value them are the “right reasons,” responsive to their particular value (as opposed to 
the threats of evil demons).8 Moreover, having reason to value something should be 
distinguished from notions of permissibility. So while counting blades of grass on the lawn may 
in some sense be permissible, one does not have a relevant reason to do so, on the assumption 
that counting blades of grass is not a valuable activity. 
By reflecting on the conditions that ground reasons to value, I develop an account of 
impersonal value that not only captures the difference between things with moral and non-moral 
value, but also accounts for the full range of reasons that persons can have for valuing a given 
thing. Importantly, I acknowledge that the achievement of impersonal value can be either 
monistic or pluralistic. In the first case, everyone has the same universal reason to value the same 
thing. In the second case, everyone is justified in valuing the same thing, but for two or more of a 
set of overlapping reasons. To the extent that these pluralistic reasons fail to overlap in a manner 
that covers all persons, we can chart the extent to which the evaluative scope of a given thing 
                                                
8 For instance, see Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, “The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-




falls away from strict universality. This analysis provides conceptual resources that offer the 
potential for resolving disputes about objects of value caught between the traditional categories 
of personal and impersonal value, which forms an insufficiently nuanced dichotomy. Rather, the 
scope of value can be highly variable depending on both the extent of individuals who have 
reason to value something, and the kinds of reasons they have, calling into question the aptness 
of the traditional distinction between impersonal and personal value. Thus, though I take the 
traditional distinction as my starting point given its prominence in the literature, and offer an 
account of impersonal value that can capture that distinction, my ultimate aim is to demonstrate 
that the distinction obscures a far more important and diverse phenomenon: the variable scope of 
value. I go on to show how the more nuanced analysis that I defend might shed light on debate 
over the universal value of cultural heritage, and argue that sentimental valuing, a key mode of 
valuing the past, is not as closely tied to personal value as one might think. The result will be a 
theory that attempts to reorient our thinking about all valuable things towards a broader 
understanding of who has reason to value them and why.  
2. Impersonal Perspective and Required Respect 
 For most philosophers, impersonal value is understood in terms of its contrast with 
personal value. That is, whether things with impersonal value are positively construed as 
independently valuable, or intrinsically valuable, or impartially valuable, they are typically 
understood as those whose value is, as T. M. Scanlon puts it, “not tied to the well-being, claims, 
or status of individuals in any particular position.”9 Consequently, accounts of impersonal value 
                                                
9 T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Belknap Press, 1998), 219. Strictly speaking, Scanlon’s claim is 
about reasons, but it is clear in context that this is directly tied to the notion of impersonal value. The impartial sense 
of impersonal value is discussed, though not endorsed, in Thomas Hurka, “The Justification of National Partiality,” 
in The Morality of Nationalism, ed. Jeff McMahan and Robert McKim (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). 




all tend to have an essential universal element. For example, Tom Hurka writes: “In the first 
place, the claim that something is good impersonally means that it is good from all points of 
view, or good from the point of view of all moral agents.”10 Given that it is this universal 
element of our intuitive understanding of impersonal value that I wish to explore, I will focus in 
this paper on two different ways of accounting for how a value might be universal, and thus 
potentially impersonal in the relevant sense. I take as my first point of departure Thomas Nagel’s 
account of impersonal value as value that can be recognized independently of any particular 
perspective: 
“…once the objective step is taken, the possibility is also open for the recognition 
of values and reasons that are independent of one’s personal perspective and have 
force for anyone who can view the world impersonally, as a place that contains 
him. If objectivity means anything here, it will mean that when we detach from 
our individual perspective and the values and reasons that seem acceptable from 
within it, we can sometimes arrive at a new conception which may endorse some 
of the original reasons but will reject some as false subjective appearances and 
add others.”11 
                                                                                                                                                       
The Journal of Ethics 11, no. 4 (2007): 405:. “Certain things we value are best described as carrying impersonal 
value, i.e., they are valued with no eye to anything but to the thing itself.” 
10 Hurka, “'Good' and 'Good For',” 71. Hurka distinguishes between the matter of for whom something is good (in 
the sense of benefiting them, among other senses) and the matter of value that is impersonal in the sense described in 
the quotation. However, I am not prepared to follow Hurka in foreclosing on use of the expression “good for” or 
“value for,” despite potential ambiguities in its meaning, given the range of options for analyzing impersonal value 
that are not exhausted by Hurka’s perspectival definition. For relevant discussion, see E. J. Bond, “'Good' and 'Good 
For': A Reply to Hurka,” Mind 97, no. 386 (1988): 279-80. I trust that the reader will understand my meaning based 
on the context and the analysis under discussion. 




 The independence from particular perspectives entails that things with impersonal value 
will involve everyone,12 or at least everyone who can reflect from the objective perspective, 
resulting in the following analysis:  
Impersonal Perspective: An object, project, (etc.) X has impersonal value just in case the 
value of X can be recognized independently of any particular perspective. 
Importantly, because the universality of impersonal value is secured on this account via 
detachment from particular perspectives, things with impersonal value necessarily have purchase 
with everyone—we abstract away from the individual interests or circumstances that might 
normally affect whether a given thing is in fact valuable for oneself.13 Put another way, to say 
that some things are impersonally valuable on this account is to say that everyone has compelling 
reason, other things being equal, to value them.14  
This analysis is characteristic of Nagel’s view. Nagel thinks that impersonal value 
generates agent-neutral reasons: these are reasons that apply to anyone, independent of his or her 
particular perspective. He writes: “… If impersonal value is going to be admitted at all, it will 
                                                
12 As Mark Schroeder puts it, Nagel posits impersonal (or agent-neutral) value based on “the uncontroversial 
distinction…between reasons that are reasons for everyone and reasons that are reasons for only some people.” 
Mark Schroeder, “Teleology, Agent-Relative Value, and 'Good',” Ethics 117 (2007): 265-95. Schroeder then goes 
on to question whether this distinction in reasons correlates with an equally simple distinction in values, though for 
different reasons than those I pursue here. 
13 One might press on precisely what the relationship is supposed to be between (1) the fact that such value can be 
recognized from a detached perspective and (2) the further claim that it therefore has the motivating or compelling 
force that Nagel attributes to it. My interpretation is that, because we are reflecting from the impersonal perspective, 
there are no partial preferences or desires that might mitigate the force of this impersonal value and the reasons that 
relate to it (I discuss this interpretation further in section 3). For instance, later on in the same text, Nagel writes: 
“The actual acceptance of a general normative judgment will have motivational implications, for it will commit you 
under some circumstances to the acceptance of reasons to want and do things yourself. This is most clear when the 
objective judgment is that something has agent-neutral or impersonal value. That means anyone has reason to want 
it to happen—and that includes someone considering the world in detachment from the perspective of any particular 
person within it. Such a judgment has motivational content even before it is brought back down to the particular 
perspective of the individual who has accepted it objectively” (154-155). However, even if the relationship between 
(1) and (2) is shaky on Nagel’s account, it suffices for my purposes here that Nagel holds both of these views. Even 
if he did not, the difference in compelling force between moral and non-moral impersonal value requires attention. 
Thanks to William FitzPatrick for encouraging me to clarify this relationship. 
14 I understand having “compelling reason, other things being equal,” as equivalent to a defeasible “requirement,” 
and will sometimes refer to it as such, though Nagel does not use the language of requirement. I will sometimes use 




naturally attach to liberty, general opportunities, and the basic resources of life, as well as to 
pleasure and the absence of suffering.”15 These things have impersonal value, according to 
Nagel, because they generate compelling reasons for anyone to act, no matter whose liberty or 
pain is in question, whether it is yours or a stranger’s: the mere fact that there is pain generates a 
reason for anyone to alleviate it. It is no surprise, then, that Nagel denies the impersonal value of 
personal projects:  
There is nothing incoherent in wanting to be able to climb Kilimanjaro or play all 
the Beethoven piano sonatas, while thinking that impersonally it doesn’t matter 
whether one can do this. In fact one would have to be dotty to think it did matter 
impersonally…If an interest is developed by the agent himself through his choices 
and actions, then the objective reasons it provides are primarily relative… what 
there is not, I believe, is a completely general impersonal value of the satisfaction 
of desires and preferences.16 
This is not to say, of course, that others cannot recognize the value of these projects for 
the persons who have an interest in them. However, the public recognition of value is not, on 
Nagel’s account, reason-generating: “each person has reasons stemming from the perspective of 
his own life which, though they can be publicly recognized, do not in general provide reasons for 
others and do not correspond to reasons that the interests of others provide for him.”17 This 
should help us see the difference between the reasons involved in actively valuing and the 
reasons associated with merely recognizing value. Though the distinction is not a stark one, the 
                                                
15 Nagel, The View from Nowhere, 171-72. 
16 Ibid., 170. 




point is that valuing involves more than merely recognizing and respecting valuable things.18 For 
instance, as Scheffler details, valuing involves dispositions to action and emotional response that 
do not attend the mere recognition of value. I can respect the project of learning to play all the 
Beethoven piano sonatas without valuing that project myself, without seeing myself as having 
reason to learn to play the sonatas, or to be frustrated by my incompetence at playing them, or 
even to promote their being played, etc. This is not to say that there are no reasons for action that 
are implicated in respect for valuable things, but just that valuing involves further reasons 
beyond those associated with mere respect. Following philosophers such as Raz and Susan Wolf, 
we might call these reasons to engage with objects of value.19 For example, a reason stemming 
from mere respect for value might be a reason not to interfere with someone else’s valuable 
activity, say, bird watching, as we will discuss below. But non-interference hardly seems a way 
of engaging with bird watching: none of the purported goods of bird watching can be realized 
through non-interference alone in the way that they can through engagement with it (such as, for 
instance, participating in the activity of bird watching). Moving forward, I will thus sometimes 
use the term “engagement” to refer to the activities and attitudes distinctive of active valuing. 
It is no wonder, then, that on Nagel’s view, all things with impersonal value are 
intuitively those with moral value. On this account of impersonal value, not only are the reasons 
associated with impersonal value reasons of engagement, but they are also compelling reasons, 
ones that carry significant weight in practical reasoning. Putting aside the specter of moral 
relativism, it has seemed to many that justice, equality, autonomy, the absence of suffering, etc. 
have value that is impersonal in this very sense: other things being equal, everyone ought to 
                                                
18 Compare, for instance, Samuel Scheffler, “Valuing,” in Equality and Tradition (Oxford University Press, 2010); 
Raz, Value, Respect, and Attachment. 
19 Susan Wolf, Meaning in Life and Why It Matters (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010); Raz, 




value them in the manner described in the Impersonal Perspective analysis (i.e. we ought to 
promote and prize them, and ensure that they play a substantive role in our evaluative and 
practical lives by being attentive to the reasons they give us). Indeed, the idea that things with 
moral value are those that everyone has compelling reason to value and engage with provides a 
plausible account of the force that moral value is typically thought to have. 
However, there are two sources of concern with this account. First, while the impersonal 
perspective might secure the universal compelling engagement that is distinctive of moral value, 
this requirement may be uncalled for or inapt in the case of non-moral impersonal value. 
Whatever may be universal about the value of Niagara Falls or the pyramids at Giza, it does not 
seem to compel us to value them in the way we are required to engage with objects of moral 
value.20 While I may have good reason to value Niagara Falls, my failure to do so does not seem 
like a mistake in the way that it is a mistake not to value autonomy; insofar as it is a mistake not 
to value Niagara Falls, it is not the mistake of failing to meet a requirement. Thus the Impersonal 
Perspective account appears to misconstrue the strength of the reasons to engage with things that 
have non-moral impersonal value.  
Second, even if one does not see compelling force as following from the impersonal 
perspective (see footnote 13), or if one does think that everyone has compelling reason to value 
Niagara Falls, the Impersonal Perspective account faces a further problem. There is an important 
difference between things whose value is universal because that value can be recognized 
independently of any particular perspective, and things whose value is universal because reasons 
for engaging with them can be found within any particular perspective. Artistic masterworks, for 
instance, are often thought of as having universal value, but plausibly this is not always because 
                                                
20 This is not to ignore the fact that moral value need not always issue in requirements (as in the case of the 
supererogatory), nor that non-moral value can sometimes have a great deal of compelling force. The distinction is a 




their value can be recognized by abstracting away from all individual perspectives and adopting 
a “view from nowhere”.21 Rather, at least some artworks of universal value seem to possess the 
power to speak to each of us, not by riding roughshod over our individual differences, but by 
appealing to a multiplicity of particular perspectives. Beyond artistic examples, there are modes 
of valuing that make essential appeal to the personal perspective, such as sentimental valuing, 
that cannot be captured from the impersonal perspective. This had led some philosophers to 
believe that sentimental value must be a kind of personal value.22 Because sentimental valuing is 
a key mode of historical valuing, the linking of sentimental value and personal value has had 
misleading implications for how we think about the evaluative scope of cultural heritage, and the 
debate over its universal value. I return to this issue in more detail in the final section. For now, it 
suffices to note that the Impersonal Perspective analysis does not account for the possibility of 
universal value that in fact requires appeal to the personal perspective.23 Impersonal value, in its 
universal sense, need not be impersonal in the perspectival sense. 
With reference to the first concern, a number of philosophers have recognized a domain 
of things that possess non-moral value with an impersonal character (insofar as they seem to 
generate some universal reasons), but that do not require the engagement distinctive of the 
Impersonal Perspective approach: while these projects, activities, and objects intuitively generate 
                                                
21 This objection is in line with many objections to understanding artistic value as being essentially “disinterested” in 
the manner championed by philosophers of art such as Clive Bell and Monroe Beardsley. For discussion, see Noel 
Carroll, “Beauty and the Genealogy of Art Theory,” in Beyond Aesthetics (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). 
22 Anthony Hatzimoysis, “Sentimental Value,” The Philosophical Quarterly 53, no. 212 (2003); Scheffler, 
“Valuing,” 26. 
23 Scheffler has noted that it is mistake to think that “values that fall on the impersonal side of the divide are values 
that can be appreciated only from a detached, ‘impersonal’ standpoint, and are not values that we ourselves 
recognize or accept.” “Projects, Relationships, and Reasons,” in Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral 
Philosophy of Joseph Raz, ed. R. Jay Wallace, et al. (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 250. He 
means, I take it, that we ourselves, from our own perspectives, endorse how things seem from the impersonal 
standpoint. I grant this point, but note that this is distinct from the matter of values that are themselves generated 




some reasons for everyone, they are not the reasons of engagement involved in actively valuing 
something. For example, consider the following remarks from Joseph Raz: 
 ...[O]bviously no one has reason to engage with all valuable objects. We need not read 
all novels, listen to all music, climb all the mountains, go to all the parties, dance in all 
the dances that are worthwhile...Not everyone has much time for Picasso’s paintings, and 
there is nothing wrong in not caring for them...But no one should destroy them or treat 
them in ways inconsistent with the fact that they are aesthetically valuable…Regarding 
what is of value, be it instrumental or intrinsic, there is a universal reason for everyone to 
respect it, which is the minimal form of engagement with value. It is the right reaction to 
what is of value even when you do not value it, you do not personally care for it.24  
In a similar vein, Scheffler writes: 
…[I]t is not only possible but commonplace to believe that something is valuable without 
valuing it oneself. There are, for example, many activities that I regard as valuable but 
which I myself do not value, including, say, folk dancing, bird-watching, and studying 
Bulgarian history. Indeed, I value only a tiny fraction of the activities that I take to be 
valuable.25 
 
This understanding of the way in which something’s value might be universal provides 
the materials for an alternative account of impersonal value. On this account, if the pyramids at 
Giza or Niagara Falls are impersonally valuable, then not everyone need be interested in them, 
                                                
24 Raz, Value, Respect, and Attachment, 164. (emphasis added). Raz distinguishes between two broad (overlapping) 
categories of reason: reasons of respect and reasons of engagement. See also Engaging Reason (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999). As Raz puts it, he is “appropriating the notion of respect to designate the general 
reasons one has to recognize the vale of all that is of value even when one does not personally value it all.” Value, 
Respect, and Attachment, 169.  




promote them, learn about them, etc., but everyone ought, at least, to respect them, and thus 
think about and act toward them in ways that are consistent with their evaluative status, e.g. by 
preserving them, not interfering with them etc.26 This account of impersonal value will thus 
involve some minimal compelling reasons for thought and action that do not include the 
additional kinds of reasons one has in virtue of actively valuing something. Such a view accounts 
for the essential element of our intuitive understanding of impersonal value; namely, it explains 
the particular way in which these values might be “for everyone,” no matter who you are. 
Moreover, though, it does so without appeal to an impersonal perspective, and thus promises to 
avoid the problems discussed above. We might describe this analysis as follows:  
Required Respect: An object, project, (etc.) X has impersonal value just in case 
(other things being equal) for all persons Y, Y has compelling reason to respect 
X.27 
The idea that all impersonally valuable things deserve respect is appealing. The problem 
with this analysis is that it fails to capture anything distinctive about impersonal value. As I argue 
below, it is plausible to believe that all things that are valued for good reasons require respect, 
even when such things have merely personal value. Hence the Required Respect analysis is not 
mistaken as a general claim about our relationship to valuable things, but it fails to capture a 
distinctive category of impersonal value. If all valuable things ought to be respected in the way 
                                                
26 With regard to non-interference in particular, see R. Jay Wallace, “The Publicity of Reasons,” Philosophical 
Perspectives 23 (2009): 471-97. 
27 The Required Respect analysis is very similar to one that Scheffler considers in his discussion of the relationship 
between believing valuable and valuing, on which the claim that X is valuable “might be understood as the claim 
that X has properties in virtue of which  (1) all people have reasons for behaving in certain (minimum) ways with 
regard to X, and (2) some people have reasons for additional actions with regard to X and for being emotionally 
vulnerable to it… valuable things give everyone, and not merely those who value them, certain minimal reasons for 
action, such as reasons not to destroy or denigrate those things.” Scheffler, “Valuing,” 36. Scheffler does not 
explicitly identify these general remarks about value as being about “impersonal value” per se, though he does 
distinguish his subject from both instrumental and personal value. The important idea for our purposes here is that 




that Required Respect appeals to, then we will still need an alternative account of what makes 
value count as impersonal. What might this be? Whatever else is true of valuable things, it at 
least seems to follow that valuable things are worth valuing.28 As David Velleman succinctly 
puts it: “Value is what something has when it is valuable, and being valuable is just being 
appropriate to value.”29 I will thus assume that some X is valuable if and only if there is reason to 
value it, though I remain neutral about any explanatory priority between the two.30 Plausibly, 
then, impersonally valuable things may be those that everyone has reason to value, though not 
necessarily compelling reason, as we saw in discussion of Impersonal Perspective. Examining 
the shortcomings of Required Respect will help us see why this kind of universal, non-required 
reason to value things best captures the distinctive idea of impersonal value, and will thus set the 
stage for the account that I present in the following section. 
Required Respect’s inability to capture a distinctive category of impersonal value is 
clearly illustrated when we consider paradigm cases of things with personal value, such as my 
grandfather’s ring, that counter-intuitively qualify as impersonally valuable on this account. I 
value my grandfather’s ring, but you do not. Indeed, you don’t have reason to value it. But as 
long as I value the ring for good reasons, it seems that you and everyone else have reason to 
respect the ring (by, for instance, not destroying it), even if only I have reason to value it. This is 
true by extension of the same considerations that motivate the Required Respect analysis in the 
                                                
28 For instance, see Christine Korsgaard’s contribution to Joseph Raz et al., The Practice of Value, The Berkeley 
Tanner Lectures  (Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press, 2005), 410-36; Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and 
Economics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); J. David Velleman, “A Theory of Value,” Ethics 118 
(2008). This position is also typical of the buck-passing account of value usually associated with Scanlon, What We 
Owe to Each Other. 
29 Velleman, “A Theory of Value,” 410. 
30 There are of course important questions about the reasons one has for valuing some X and whether they might not 
be “the wrong kind of reasons,” but this question at least assumes that the right kind of reasons are out there to be 
had. For the purposes of this paper, I am confining discussion to valuing for the right kind of reasons. For recent 
discussion, see the symposium on Mark Schroeder’s “The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons,” in Ethics, Vol. 124, 




first place. Whether or not I ought to respect bird watching or Niagara Falls, for instance, does 
not depend on whether I value them, but only on whether they are valuable. If whether you ought 
to respect some X depends only on whether it is valuable, then whether or not you have reason to 
value X should likewise be irrelevant to whether or not you ought to respect it. All that matters is 
that X is valuable, even if its value is highly personal, and thus only few have reason to value it. 
Thus, the breed of universality captured by Required Respect applies equally well to paradigm 
cases of things with personal value. In this light, it seems that what makes things like my 
grandfather’s ring intuitively fail to have impersonal value is the very fact that not everyone has 
reason to value them, even if everyone has reason to respect them. 
The importance of this observation extends beyond paradigm cases of things with 
personal value. Consider some of Scheffler and Raz’s examples of valuable things that ought to 
be respected by everyone. I do not dispute that these things should indeed be universally 
respected. But in contrast, how universal is it to have reason to value fine piano playing, or to 
have reason to value bird watching? If it is a commonplace feature of our evaluative lives to say 
“I respect X, but I myself don't value it” I suggest that we should find it equally natural to ask the 
further question “would I even have reason to value X? Would it even make sense?” Just as what 
we in fact value is a combination of the independent value of some X and the interest that we 
take in it, what we have reason to value is a combination of the independent value of some X and 
the conditions that warrant our taking an interest in it.31 When we respect some valuable X but 
do not value it ourselves, the conditions that give us reason to value X might hold or they might 
                                                
31 Compare Korsgaard’s contribution to Raz et al., The Practice of Value. As R. Jay Wallace nicely summarizes her 
view in the introduction to that volume: “the standards that determine when and in what ways it would be 
appropriate to value a given object are specified not by social practices, but by the nature both of the object to be 
valued and of the person engaged in the activity of evaluative reflection” (8). I am less inclined to reject the 
relevance of social practices, but, as indicated above, I agree with the comprehensive approach (including both the 




not. Surely, of the set of individuals who respect bird watching without valuing it, there are some 
who nevertheless have reason to value bird watching, even if they happen not to. But equally 
clear, I believe, is that there may be many members of this set of individuals who lack reason to 
value bird watching: perhaps people who dislike the outdoors, who are impatient, who disdain 
quiet and stillness, etc. On what plausible basis might we say that such individuals have reason to 
value bird watching? On the contrary, the fact that these people have reason to respect bird 
watching as a valuable activity does not imply that they have reason to value it. Thus Required 
Respect claims the mantle of impersonal value for things that there is not universal reason to 
value. Of course, things like bird watching and piano playing do not seem quite like our 
paradigm cases of things with personal value either, and so the accounts we have considered so 
far appear to leave them in limbo. We thus begin to see that the traditional stark distinction 
between personal and impersonal value is inadequate: it cannot properly capture the evaluative 
scope of things whose value is neither particular nor universal, a problem that I will address in 
the following sections. 
The fact is that whether we are considering bird watching, Niagara Falls, or my 
grandfather’s ring, it is plausible to think that just insofar as these things are valued for good 
reason, then everyone ought to respect them. This follows from the publicity of reasons and our 
ability as rational agents to recognize the reasons of others.32 However, it is not necessarily true 
of all these things that anyone has reason to value them. Raz, for one, sometimes seems to 
suggest that all legitimately valuable things have an impersonal element, such that anyone might 
reasonably value them, and that ‘personal value’ is just a way of describing those impersonally 
valuable things we happen to have an interest in. As he puts it: “How then does the personal 
                                                
32 Compare Wallace, “The Publicity of Reasons.” Nagel, The View from Nowhere. For a different approach to 




meaning of attachments and their objects relate to their (impersonal) value? Simply: our 
attachments appropriate (impersonal) value, and make it meaningful for us. They go well beyond 
the recognition of the value of their objects…The personal meaning of objects, causes, and 
pursuits depends on their impersonal value, and is conditional on it.”33 But as we have seen, this 
view precludes the possibility of valuable things, personally valuable or otherwise, that not 
everyone has reason to value. 
Now, it sometimes seems that what Raz means when he says that personal value is 
conditional on impersonal value is that it is conditional on something’s having intrinsic or 
independent value: independent, that is, of my merely having an interest in it. This is suggested 
when he writes (just prior to the previous quotation): “In general, an attachment [i.e. his term for 
personal value] must have a worthy object to be valuable.”34 Or elsewhere: “Their impersonal 
value [that of specific attachments]… is their value to one were they to be one’s attachments, 
which is independent of the fact that they were embraced by one as one’s attachments.”35 This is 
a plausible and familiar claim (see footnote 36). Certainly my grandfather’s ring, for instance, is 
independently valuable in the sense that it is worth valuing for me independent of whether I 
value it. If I happened to not value the ring, my sister could provide me with reasons for why I 
perhaps should. But this is not, of course, independent of my specific relation to the ring and its 
history—its value is not independent of facts about me. So its having independent value (in the 
sense of being worth valuing for me independent of whether I value it) does not make it worth 
valuing for everyone. Thus, the notions of independent value and impersonal value cannot be 
                                                
33 Raz, Value, Respect, and Attachment, 19-20. To be clear, those parenthetical “impersonal” references are in the 
original text.   
34 Ibid., 19. Compare Scanlon, who described “judgments of impersonal value” as “the judgment that these objects 
are worth seeing and should be admired.” What We Owe to Each Other, 220.  




conflated if we are to maintain the intuitive proviso that distinctively impersonal values are those 
that everyone indeed has reason to value.  
Ultimately, Required Respect retreats too far from Impersonal Perspective. According to 
Impersonal Perspective, everyone has compelling reason to value impersonally valuable things, 
which correctly entails the weaker claim that everyone has a reason to value them; however, this 
account implausibly elevates all impersonally valuable things to the status of being morally 
valuable by requiring that everyone value them and that they be recognizable from the 
impersonal perspective. Required Respect attempts to make room for the universal value of 
things with non-moral impersonal value, but it jettisons the proviso that impersonally valuable 
things are those that everyone has reason to value—indeed, Required Respect states a truth about 
the relation between value and reason that applies to all valuable things, personal and impersonal 
alike, and does not describe a feature that is distinctive of the subset of things whose value is 
distinctively impersonal. Hence, we need a middle ground: an account of impersonally valuable 
things that succeeds in capturing the fact that there is universal reason to value them without 
hitching them to the impersonal perspective or attributing to them the compelling status of being 
morally valuable.  
3. Reason to Value 
 In order to construct such an account, we first must consider in greater detail the 
conditions that ground reasons for valuing things. The conditions canvassed here are meant to be 
a sketch; I don't assume that I have definitively established any list of necessary or sufficient 
conditions for having reason to value any given thing. My goal is to continue to motivate the idea 
that a wide variety of such conditions exist. Specifically, for the purposes of this paper, I desire 




which is in turn an indispensable aspect of understanding the practical significance of valuable 
things. If this is true, then it constitutes a clarion call for further research into the conditions that 
ground reasons to value. 
There appears to be a diversity of ways in which reasons to value some X can be 
generated. One way arises in the case of bird watching considered above. Given some 
independently valuable X, whether or not a particular individual will have reason to value X 
might depend on that person’s other interests and values.36 If I am in fact a nature-lover with a 
penchant for patient classification, then I may well have reason to value bird watching. Of 
course, I’m not required to value it, but it seems I have good reason to.37 
 Reasons to value some X can further be generated in the context of what Scheffler calls 
“positional valuing.” For instance, Scheffler describes an example in which 
…I have just heard a glowing account of the friendship between two people whom I have 
never met and with whom I have no connection. I might think, on the basis of this 
account, that their friendship sounds like a valuable one. It would be bizarre, however, for 
me to say that I value their friendship…I cannot value the friendship in the same way that 
the participants can; it cannot play the same role in my emotional life and practical 
deliberations.38 
Scheffler describes such cases as ones in which the following two conditions are true: “(1) that 
only those who occupy the right position in relation to the thing are capable of valuing it, or of 
                                                
36 The claim that what matters in life, what makes one’s life go well, etc. involves being engaged with independently 
valuable things is very familiar in the literature. For examples, see the works of Scheffler, Raz, Nagel, Wolf and 
Wallace mentioned so far. 
37 It should be noted that in cases like this, one’s reasons to value bird watching might overlap substantially with the 
reasons one has to engage in bird watching in virtue of (or that constitute) valuing it. But they can come apart. For 
instance, I might have some additional reasons, say to purchase special supplies, attend conventions, etc. in virtue of 
actively valuing bird watching (and having a prolonged commitment to it) that I might not have as someone who has 
reason to go bird watching, but doesn’t, as it happens, value bird watching. This starts to bleed over into the ways in 
which a historical relation to some X can affect one’s reasons for valuing it. 




valuing it in a certain way, and (2) that not everyone is capable of occupying the right position in 
relation to that thing.”39 
 Positional valuing can come in multiple forms. In its most literal manifestation, you may 
have or lack reason to value something based on your geographical location. There may be 
practices or activities that are suited to particular climes, but would be utterly alien in others (for 
instance, ice fishing or snorkeling). You may have or lack reason to value something based on 
your knowledge: a specialist in music, art, mathematics, or a specific trade may have special 
reasons to value objects or practices that are inaccessible in the absence of the relevant 
understanding. And I don’t want to rule out the possibility of positional valuing based on 
nationality, ethnicity, or religion. However, it should be noted that where occupying such 
positions is necessary for grounding reasons to value, it may only be necessary to certain kinds of 
reasons to value, and thus only necessary for having a reason to value some X in a certain way 
(e.g. while having a certain kind of relation to an object may be necessary for my having reason 
to value it sentimentally, other conditions may be sufficient for my having reason to value the 
same object in other ways, for instance, morally or aesthetically). Determining how various 
conditions relate to different reasons for valuing will no doubt be highly specific to the particular 
valuable X in question. 
 A final kind of positional valuing, perhaps deserving of its own category, is valuing that 
is based on one’s historical position. The valuable relationship that Scheffler describes would 
best be understood in these terms. In order to have reason to value a relationship, you need to 
have the kind of history of interactions with something or someone that constitute a relationship 
in the first place: a relationship is itself an historical relation.40 An historical position is also what 
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gives me, but not you, a reason to value my grandfather’s ring. As we will see in the following 
section, the relevance of different kinds of historical relations is essential to understanding the 
dispute over the evaluative scope of cultural heritage, but is glossed over by the foregoing 
accounts of impersonal value. For now, suffice it to say that there are multiple positional 
conditions that can generate reasons for valuing. 
 A third way reasons to value some X may be generated is with respect to the mere fact 
that one is human, or a rational agent. According to various theorists, this is what grounds a 
range of moral values and requirements, and indeed, one’s perspective qua human or rational 
agent just is the impersonal perspective described by Nagel that anchors the Impersonal 
Perspective account.41 However, features like rationality or being human may provide reasons to 
value things in non-moral contexts as well. For instance, it may be that simply being human 
provides one with a reason to value the prehistoric places and artifacts that shed light on, or are 
associated with, our development as a species. Or maybe such features can be part of what gives 
us reason to value instances of great beauty, however such aesthetic values are understood. Such 
features would of course not be positional with respect to subsets of humans or rational agents, 
but would include everyone within the relevant class.         
 Bearing in mind the diversity of ways in which one might have reason to value 
something, we can introduce a new analysis of impersonal value: 
Reason to Value: An object, project, (etc.) X has impersonal value just in case (other 
things being equal) for all persons Y, Y has a reason (though not necessarily a compelling 
one) to value X.  
                                                
41 Or in the constructivist tradition, consider that moral requirements on Christine Korsgaard’s account are grounded 
in reflection from one’s practical identity as a person. See Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (New 




I believe this analysis offers a number of considerations in its favor. We should first be careful to 
distinguish this account from the Impersonal Perspective analysis with which we began. As we 
observed, it seems to follow from the Impersonal Perspective account that things with 
impersonal value are those that everyone ought to value, where ought is understood in the sense 
of a requirement stemming from the presence of compelling reasons. This is why, as we noted, 
this analysis seems plausible for things with moral value, but because of reasonable assumptions 
about value pluralism, is problematic for things with non-moral value. In contrast, according to 
Reason to Value, it would not be a requirement for everyone to value an impersonally valuable 
thing; one would merely have reason to do so. We thus have the resources for distinguishing the 
universality of moral value from the universality of non-moral value, and we avoid the counter-
intuitive implications that stem from collapsing them into a single category. 
Second, this analysis gives respect for valuable things its properly broad scope. It allows 
that all rational agents ought to respect X simply in virtue of there being reason for some Y to 
value it, and not contingently upon X’s being impersonally valuable. This affirms the public 
nature of reasons, and the plausible claim that any rational agent in the right epistemic situation 
should respect good reasons, even if they are completely beyond the pale of reasons that could 
apply to oneself. 
Finally, and most importantly, this analysis can accommodate two different ways in 
which everyone might have reason to value X. The first we can call “monistic” universal reason. 
This is the case when everyone has a reason to value X, and everyone has the same reason to 
value X. So, as considered above, features such as shared humanity, or rational agency, that 
generate reasons to value X will be monistic: everyone will have the same reason to value X. 




by Nagel. Recall that according to Impersonal Perspective, a key feature that makes impersonal 
value have the compelling force characteristic of moral value is the very fact that this is the only 
kind of value that generates agent-neutral reasons that can be endorsed from the detached 
perspective. If impersonal value holds independently of one’s individual interests and 
circumstances, then these features of one’s personal perspective can have no bearing on whether 
impersonally valuable things qualify as relevant for oneself, and thus whether the relevant agent-
neutral reasons apply. But, picking up the objection to Impersonal Perspective from Section 2 
concerning universally valuable things that must be recognized from within one’s personal 
perspective, we can distinguish between reasons and values that apply simply because one is 
human independently of one’s particular interests and circumstances, and those that apply simply 
because one is human among one’s other particular interests and circumstances. In the former 
case, the independence from particular perspectives ensures the compelling force of the relevant 
reasons, and hence the requirement to engage with things that possess this kind of value. In the 
latter case, everyone might share the same reason in virtue of their shared humanity, but it is a 
reason the force of which is mitigated by the other features of one’s personal perspective. So for 
instance, simply being human may be sufficient to ground reasons for valuing the history of our 
species or natural wonders, without giving us compelling reason to do so—we may have other 
interests and circumstances that render these things unimportant to us, despite our having reason 
to value them. So unlike Impersonal Perspective, Reason to Value makes room for valuable 
things that are a function of a common reason but do not have the compelling force of moral 
value. Though anyone may have reason to engage with these valuable things, it is not required.  
We can call the second way in which everyone can have reason to value a given X 




is no single reason to value X that everyone shares in common. Rather, various relevant 
considerations generate different reasons for everyone to value the same X. This might be the 
case where, for instance, various forms of positional valuing overlap.42 As we will see in the next 
section, the possibility of impersonal value that is a function of pluralistic universal reasons is 
key to removing the impasse created by the traditional distinction between impersonal and 
personal value. 
Indeed, these considerations suggest that philosophers have expected too much from the 
category of impersonal value. Knowing which values are universal is important, but only as a 
component of the more general task, essential to moral and evaluative inquiry, of determining 
who has reason to value something. It is our reasons for valuing that are most intimately 
connected with what it makes sense for us to care about, and thus with practical reason. If, as 
Raz has said, “…[T]he point of values is realized when it is possible to appreciate them, and 
when it is possible to relate to objects of value in ways appropriate to their value,”43 then it is 
essential that we examine the different ways in which different individuals have reason to relate 
to valuable things. By focusing on the diversity of reasons for valuing, Reason to Value has the 
resources not only to account for those things whose value is universal, but also to guide 
productive inquiry into the more limited evaluative scope of other things whose value may not 
intuitively be understood as personal, but is not strictly universal either.  
What we have seen so far is that the range of ways in which we might relate to some 
valuable X goes far beyond the simple dichotomy provided by the Impersonal Perspective and 
                                                
42 This is similar to Wallace’s claim that there is a “diversity of ways in which a common value can provide agents 
who are differently situated with different kinds of reasons.” Wallace, “The Publicity of Reasons,” 482. The 
difference is that Wallace’s claim is about how a single shared value can provide different reasons for different 
people, whereas my claim here is that people can have different reasons to value the same thing. I believe that both 
claims are true. 




Required Respect analyses. The Reason to Value analysis both captures our intuitive sense of 
impersonal value and provides us with the conceptual resources to leave behind the emphasis on 
the sharp distinction between impersonal and personal value. There can be universal 
requirements to value X, as in the case of moral values. There can be universal requirements to 
respect X in virtue of some person having a good reason to value it. And there can be universal 
reason to value X where such valuing is not required, either because everyone shares the same 
reason (monistic) or because everyone has one of a number of reasons (pluralistic) to value X. 
To the extent that these pluralistic reasons fail to overlap in a manner that covers all persons, we 
can chart the extent to which the value of X falls away from strict universality.  
4. Reasons to Value History and the Scope of Cultural Heritage 
Once we recognize that the extent to which value is personal or impersonal is best 
analyzed in terms of diverse reasons to value, we have new resources for clarifying the terms of 
disputes over object whose evaluative scope is contested. Instead of a stark contrast between the 
impersonal and the personal divided on the basis of which valuable things can be recognized 
from a detached perspective or which command respect, we have the diverse array of reasons to 
value (and to whom and how they apply) with which to analyze competing claims regarding the 
scope of different valuable things. As noted above, the Reason to Value approach also allows us 
to account for the widely varied evaluative scope of different things whose values is not 
universal, in contrast with the all-or-nothing approach of traditional accounts. In this section, I 
will briefly explore the practical implications of this account for determining the evaluative 
scope of history and cultural heritage. While it will no doubt still be difficult in certain cases to 
assess who has reason to value such things, the conditions surveyed in the previous section that 




headway in tackling these cases. I do not claim to resolve this difficult issue here, but simply to 
demonstrate the advantages of approaching it with the more comprehensive accounts of 
impersonal value and evaluative scope that I have presented. 
Consider two opposing views about the evaluative scope of cultural heritage. The 
Universalist claims that cultural heritage has impersonal value in the sense that everyone has 
reason to value it. The Particularist claims that the value of cultural heritage is particular to 
specific groups, and is thus more like personal value.44 The impersonal perspective is ill suited to 
capture the value of situated histories, and surely we have reason to respect other people’s 
heritage even if the particularist account is correct. However, if we adopt the Reason to Value 
account and examine the reasons that one might have to value cultural heritage, we can begin to 
adjudicate between these two conflicting approaches. 
 It should be no surprise that the older things get, the more likely one is to find 
universalist claims made about their value. As one bioanthropologist puts it: “Ancient skeletons 
belong to everyone…[they are] the remnants of unduplicable evolutionary events which all 
                                                
44 These views are based on the internationalist and nationalist positions described in Merryman, “Two Ways of 
Thinking About Cultural Property.” This has become a common way to frame the debate. See, for example, Kwame 
Anthony Appiah, “Whose Culture Is It, Anyway?,” in Cosmopolitanism (New York, London: W. W. Nortion & 
Company, 2006). I have excised the political language they use in order to focus on the evaluative issue. The 
universalist position is based, as Merryman describes, on the Hague Convention of 1954, whereas the particularist 
position is based on the UNESCO convention of 1970. With regard to the universalist position, consider 
also this quote from the UNESCO convention of 1982: “their value cannot be confined to one 
nation or to one people, but is there to be shared by every man, woman and child of the globe,” as 
cited in Atle Omland, “The Ethics of the World Heritage Concept,” in The Ethics of Archaeology: Philosophical 
Perspectives on Aracheological Practice, ed. Chris Scarre and Geoffrey Scarre (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 247. This helps distinguish the universalist claim from another kind of universalism with which it 
might be confused. For instance, one might claim that cultural heritage is universally valuable in the sense that 
everyone should value the heritage of his or her own culture. This is akin to the claim that relationships have 
universal value, but everyone should value his or her own relationships. As the UNESCO 1982 quote brings out, 
though, this is not the sense of universal value the universalist has in mind. Rather, it is the claim that anyone has 




living and future peoples have the right to know about and understand.”45 There is something to 
this claim: the knowledge that study of an ancient skeleton might yield seems to have a value 
independent of any specific culture, and is thus a likely candidate for being significant to anyone, 
such that anyone may have a reason to value it. This would be a form of monistic universal 
reason. Even those who express a general skepticism about the universal value of cultural 
heritage acknowledge this possibility. Henry Cleere writes: 
Viewed against the entire spectrum of human culture, it is difficult to conceive of any 
cultural property as possessing true universality, as implied by this generally accepted 
definition, with the possible exception of major human palaeontological sites (e.g. the 
Peking Man site in China) or Palaeolithic rock-art sites (Altamira, Spain; Tassili n' Ajjer, 
Algeria), which represent a remote period before human society and culture became 
excessively diversified.46 
 
This is consistent with an approach to archeological research that, according to Alison Wylie 
“was being institutionalized in North American museums and universities at the beginning of the 
twentieth century [and] was distinguished, above all else, by a commitment to approaching 
archaeological material as a record of the cultural past whose significance lay in its informational 
content (as evidence), not its aesthetic or sentimental or commercial value.”47 Wylie goes on to 
critique this understanding of the significance of cultural heritage, which treats scientific truth as 
constituting a universal value over and above values of the other kinds mentioned. She notes that 
                                                
45 Reported in David Hurst Thomas’s Skull Wars: Kennewick Man, Archaeology, and the Battle for Native American 
Identity (Basic Books, 2000) as quoted in Alison Wylie, “The Promise and Perils of an Ethic of Stewardship,” in 
Embedding Ethics, ed. Lynn Meskell and Peter Pels (Oxford, New York: Berg, 2005), 47-48. 
46 Henry Cleere, “The Concept of 'Outstanding Universal Value' in the World Heritage Convention,” Conservation 
and Management of Archaeological Sites 1 (1996): 228; Cf. Omland, “The Ethics of the World Heritage Concept,” 
249. 




this persists as a potential problem for “stewardship” models of archaeology, even though they 
get away from the concept of property altogether: “The impulse inherent in the concept of 
stewardship is to seek some reference point, some foundation that transcends local, individual 
interests on which to base its claims,” which in the context of archeology, tends to evince itself 
in appeal to a “panhuman interest in a particular kind of knowledge about the cultural past.”48 To 
avoid this problem, Wylie contends that stewardship “must be construed not as a matter of wise 
management on behalf of an abstract higher interest (that of science and, by extension, society or 
humanity) but as a matter of collaborative, negotiated co-management among divergent interests 
(including archeological interests) none of which can be presumed, at the outset, to take 
precedence over the others.”49 
These considerations should remind us that historical significance is dependent upon a 
broad, non-historical context of interests and concerns. As Arthur Danto writes: “a particular 
thing or occurrence acquires historical significance in virtue of its relations to some other thing 
or occurrence in which we happen to have some special interest, or to which we attach some 
importance, for whatever reason.”50 The archeological concern with extracting knowledge from 
historical artifacts is certainly justified by a range of human interests, including the importance to 
us of explanation and understanding. But these concerns are of a largely different kind from the 
sentimental attachments associated with the historical significance of, for example, family 
heirlooms and cherished places. One does not typically aim to learn anything about the past from 
a family heirloom, as its significance is understood in a non-informational context: knowledge is 
not what interests me about my grandfather’s ring. Thus one difficulty that faces us in thinking 
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49 Ibid., 65. 
50 Arthur C. Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History (Cambridge University Press, 1965), 167; Compare Arash 
Abizadeh, “Historical Truth, National Myths and Liberal Democracy: On the Coherence of Liberal Nationalism,” 




about cultural heritage consists in its varied modes of historical significance, grounded in, among 
other things, both a concern with knowledge and a concern with personal attachment.51 
As one might expect, the sentimental valuing52 of cultural heritage, the mode of valuation 
pertaining to personal attachment, tends to be associated with a particularist analysis that is more 
specific to certain groups.53 It is worth pausing to focus on the kind of experience that this mode 
of valuation involves. It is not for nothing that we call the objects to which we have particular 
attachments objects of sentimental value: the emotions figure centrally in this mode of valuation. 
As Scheffler notes, valuing in general seems to involve (among other things) being susceptible to 
a range of emotions, which will vary depending on the thing that is valued.54 In the case of 
sentimental value, these might include pride, nostalgia, fondness, or just being verklempt. 
Scheffler, as is common, associates sentimental value with personal value, understood as 
something “being valuable only to him or herself.”55 However, the character of the experience of 
sentimental value suggests a mode of valuation that can transcend the circumstances of a single 
                                                
51 In addition to sentimental value, Wylie also mentions aesthetic and commercial value. Commercial value is 
instrumental, and aesthetic value strikes me (perhaps idealistically) as intuitively universal. I focus here on 
sentimental value as offering the most plausible rallying point for the particularist. There is no doubt more to be said 
about the role of political sovereignty in this debate as well, but there is insufficient space to address it here. For 
further discussion of kinds of historical value had by archaeological objects, see James O. Young, “The Values of 
the Past,” in Appropriating the Past, ed. Geoffrey Scarre and Robin Coningham (USA: Cambridge University Press, 
2013). 
52 I have a more capacious understanding of sentimental value than that articulated by Guy Fletcher, “Sentimental 
Value,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (2009): 55-65. Fletcher identifies sentimental value as just one value type 
within a class of extrinsic final values, including those associated with “public monuments, war memorials, and 
historical documents and artifacts.” However, this differentiation neglects the fact that sentimental value itself seems 
to have an essential historical element that makes paring off the historical cases that Fletcher mentions less 
plausible. Consistent with the arguments in this essay, I prefer to distinguish these different cases based on the scope 
of the reasons for valuing. 
53 Coningham, Cooper, and Pollard, for instance, follow others (particularly economists) in distinguishing among 
use value, option value, and existence value, and criticize the identification of “World Heritage” sites (as part of 
UNESCO 1972), which they claim must necessarily select and prioritize a single value type as important to “the 
whole world.” Robin Coningham, Rachel Cooper, and Mark Pollard, “What Value a Unicorn's Horn? A Study of 
Archaeological Uniqueness and Value,” in The Ethics of Archaeology: Philosophical Perspectives on 
Aracheological Practice, ed. Chris Scarre and Geoffrey Scarre (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
267-68. It is perhaps no surprise, and serves to undermine the purported universality of the values used in the 
selection process, that almost 50% of UNESCO World Heritage sites are in Europe. See Cleere, “The Concept of 
'Outstanding Universal Value' in the World Heritage Convention,” 229. 
54 Scheffler, “Valuing.” 




individual. Indeed, it seems perfectly natural for a group at a reunion to be sentimental about 
their school, for disparate individuals to be sentimental about their hometown, perhaps even for 
co-nationals to be sentimental about their constitution, where these emotions are understood as 
an appropriate response to the value of the object in question. It is thus misleading to conceive of 
sentimental value as necessarily personal, at least with respect to its scope. It is true that personal 
value often takes the form of sentimental value, but sentimental value is not, I think, relegated to 
only the personal context.56 
 The emotions associated with sentimental value might be described as involving a 
general feeling of belonging.57 Objects of sentimental value tend to feel like ours even if we 
don’t technically own them. Think of former students returning to high school to hang out on 
their bench, or a softball team that likes to go to their bar after the game. Even long after the bar 
is gone, they might walk by and say “this is where our bar used to be.” Moreover, we often feel 
like we belong in places of sentimental value. This is part and parcel of the sense in which they 
belong to us. What makes the bar feel like theirs is that they feel at home there. It is no wonder, 
then, that sentimental value is essentially historical in nature: we don’t get sentimental about new 
things or places because they don’t yet belong to us, or us to them. It takes time to develop that 
kind of relationship.58 
                                                
56 I thus diverge from the personal analysis of sentimental value suggested by Hatzimoysis, “Sentimental Value.” 
However, this is largely because Hatzimoysis seems to adopt the Impersonal Perspective account of impersonal 
value that I have questioned in this essay, claiming “sentimental value is personal because it is not impersonal, since 
it is part of a phenomenon that involves a point of view of the world.” However, I think Hatzimoysis is right to note 
that “an object is sentimentally valuable to an agent for certain reasons, which, by the very fact of being reasons, are 
in principle intelligible by everyone else,” though, as I have suggested above, wrong to conclude with “even though 
they are not applicable to anyone else.” These reasons can indeed be applicable to others who stand in the relevant 
relations to the valued objects: these are cases of positional valuing described in the previous section. 
57 Compare Cohen, “Rescuing Conservatism,” 223. 
58 Compare Scheffler’s remarks about carving out a space in time in “The Normativity of Tradition.” Also, see Raz: 




 I suspect that this fundamental aspect of sentimental value might help explain the extent 
of the tensions over the evaluative scope of cultural heritage. Although the sense of belonging at 
the heart of sentimental valuing is in one way weaker than the legal sense because it lacks the 
rights and privileges that we associate with legal ownership, it is in another sense stronger: the 
deed to a house may be taken away, or a car repossessed, but these alterations in legal status do 
nothing to affect the historical sense in which it is still his house, or her car. Indeed, the strength 
of “historical ownership,” in contrast with the legal variety, can be a primary impetus for one’s 
desire to reestablish legal ownership: one retains the strong sense in which the object is still 
one’s possession, and one wants to regain the rights and privileges afforded by legal ownership, 
as well as the public recognition and respect that attends such status. 
  Recall that our question is “Who has reason to value cultural heritage?” with the 
universalists saying everyone and the particularist saying only specific groups. But notice that 
the universalists don’t have to be right for the particularists to be wrong. It may be that there are 
in fact few, if any, things with non-moral value that everyone has reason to engage with. 
However, all it takes to defeat the particularist claim is for it to be true that the reasons for 
valuing cultural heritage need not depend in a necessary way on the kind of local context that 
they claim it does (i.e. ancestry, birth-place, upbringing, cultural knowledge, etc.). And I think 
that in most cases they need not. 
However, return to our paradigm object of personal value: What makes it the case that I 
have reason to value my grandfather’s ring, but you do not? The obvious answer is that the 
historical features of the ring that make it significant (having belonged to my grandfather) simply 
are not relevant to you: it would make no sense if you valued the ring for that reason. Indeed, as 




piece of jewelry. We understand the phenomenon of people being attached to histories with 
which they are involved, but it can be difficult to see how a stranger is involved in the history I 
shared with my grandfather. Thus, cases like family heirlooms and mementos provide a potential 
model for the particularist position in the case of cultural heritage: if the particularist wants to 
deny that objects of cultural heritage are equally significant for everyone she can appeal to the 
shared history between the object and a people, much as one would in the case of my 
grandfather’s ring. 
However, this move is not so easily achieved. Many citizens of a national group (or a 
religious or ethnic one, for that matter) cannot actually claim a recent common history with a 
land or nation: globalization has seen to that. Literally sharing a close common ancestry with the 
original owners of cultural objects with which nations tend to identify is even less likely. This 
model may even, surprisingly, tell in favor of a universalist understanding of the significance of 
cultural heritage, at least beginning at a certain point in history: a universalist might claim that 
everyone has a justified interest in historical artifacts that date back to the most recent common 
ancestor of all living humans, which scientists estimate to have lived between 5,000 and 2,000 
years ago.59 
However, these considerations might equally well be thought to call into question the 
relevance of ancestry for grounding reason to value cultural heritage. While appeal to ancestry is 
understandable as a basis for analyzing the relevance of cultural heritage (after all, it is a fairly 
objective way of charting humanity’s course back through time) the more one focuses on the 
difficulties of an account of heritage based on actual ancestry, the more arbitrary ancestry seems 
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as a necessary criterion for having reason to value it.60 It certainly isn’t a necessary condition of 
my having reason to value my grandfather’s ring: I would still have such a reason if I had been 
adopted, or been a close friend. All that seems to matter is that my grandfather was a valued part 
of my life, and thus I have reason to value his ring in virtue of the historical feature of its having 
belonged to him. This is not to say that ancestry could not still serve as a sufficient condition for 
having a reason to value cultural heritage, but sufficient conditions are not what we’re looking 
for here. The particularist position claims that only some people have reason to value cultural 
heritage. For the reasons stated, I am skeptical that ancestry might be a necessary condition with 
such a consequence. 
 I think there is some truth to the universalist idea that the farther back in time we go, the 
more universal the value of cultural heritage becomes. As we have seen, there is a point in time 
at which there is no distinction to be made between cultural history and human history, and we 
thus all share the relevant feature (being human) that makes us part of that history, and thus 
grounds valuing it in both informational and even sentimental ways.61 This is the monistic form 
of universal reason. It might be thought of, in this regard, as similar to the value of the natural 
world: “For the natural world, just as much as human culture, has a particular history that is part 
of our history and part of our context, both explaining and giving significance to our lives. Thus 
what it is that we value about an ancient human habitation has much more in common with what 
it is that we value about the natural world.”62 But moreover, even as we move beyond the point 
of common ancestry, our links with the past remain broad and far-reaching. Ancestry, 
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geography, citizenship, academic study, and personal identification may all be sufficient (though 
not individually necessary) conditions for having reason to value cultural heritage, and there are 
few expanses of time that we cannot relate to in one of these ways.63 Thus we can potentially 
make sense of the impersonal value of cultural heritage even when its universality is achieved 
through an overlapping plurality of reasons. This is the pluralistic universalism made possible by 
the Reason to Value account, which can secure a range of reasons for everyone to value 
something, even when those reasons vary from person to person. It is only when cultural heritage 
becomes very local, in both time and place, that most others lack a reason for valuing it, and thus 
where a particularist claim regarding its value might be asserted. It is truly the case that only a 
few people have reason to value my grandfather’s ring, but most significant aspects of history 
and heritage simply are not like that: they have a much further reach than their temporally and 
geographically local communities. Importantly, even if one disagrees with my assessments about 
the scope of cultural heritage here, the Reason to Value account clearly provides us with the 
conceptual space to productively debate what forms of cultural heritage might have universal 
value and why, as well as why and to what extent the value of other forms of cultural heritage 
might fail to achieve universality.  
5. Conclusion  
As important as I believe these considerations are to understanding the range of persons 
who have reason to value cultural heritage, they do not obviate the claims that nations or other 
groups might have to the ownership or possession of such heritage: in addition to legal or 
political bases for those claims (which there is not sufficient space to consider here), there is a 
value-based claim for keeping heritage objects in their appropriate local context. While I have 
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argued that local conditions such as nationality and ancestry are not necessary conditions for 
persons to have reasons to value heritage objects, there may well be an important sense in which 
local context is essential for appreciating and understanding the historical significance of such 
objects. This is true not just for archeological scientists, but also for those who engage in non-
informational modes of valuation. The recent resolution of the ownership of the artifacts from 
Machu Picchu, a case with which we began our discussion, provides a fitting example of how 
local possession can be balanced with recognition of broad reasons for valuing cultural heritage. 
Yale has recently agreed to repatriate the Incan artifacts to Peru, where, in partnership with the 
Universidad Nacional de San Antonio Abade del Cusco, they have opened a new UNSAAC-Yale 
International Center for the Study of Machu Picchu.64 This provides the local context necessary 
for engaging with the value of the Incan artifacts, while taking steps to increase access in 
recognition of the fact that reasons for valuing such artifacts extends beyond the borders of Peru 
or of the descendants of Incan peoples.65 Thus my argument provides theoretical justification for 
this partnership, which could serve as a model for the repatriation of other historically significant 
artifacts.66 
In conclusion, I hope in this last section to have used the Reason to Value analysis to 
illuminate the debate over the evaluative scope of cultural heritage, as well as to put pressure on 
the view that the value of cultural heritage, in particular the sentimental value associated with 
particularist attachments, is necessarily specific to local interest groups. This has required putting 
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65 Of course, one might ask, if the artifacts are in a museum, why should it matter where the museum is located? 
How does this provide local context? The answers to these questions depend on how the museum is constructed, and 
the specific programs developed there to take advantage of that context. Surely, at least on the value-based approach 
I’ve been discussing, there are ways that a museum might be constructed and managed so as to take advantage of or 
obviate the potential benefits of local context. 
66 Despite my defense of the wide scope of reasons for valuing cultural heritage, I am a strong proponent of 




aside the stark contrast between impersonal and personal value. I have noted that there are good 
reasons why local groups should maintain possession of local heritage objects (including 
histories of injustice that there has not been space to explore here), but I have argued this is not 
because locals are the only ones who have reason to value them. 
 In a larger context, I hope to have shown that traditional accounts of impersonal value 
have been in need of revision. I have argued that attention to the reasons we have to value things 
is essential to our best understanding of value, which moreover allows for a more nuanced 
approach to understanding the evaluative scope of different things. My hope is that further 
investigation into this dimension of our evaluative lives will yield fruitful results, not just in the 
study of our relationship to the past, but also in the many other areas of moral and political 
philosophy where disputes about the scope of value, and the things that possess it, often arise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
